INTERMEDIATED PURCHASE-AND-RESALE AUCTIONS

A government or other sponsor commissions an intermediary to buy certified removals through competitive, long-term supply contracts and resell them through separate, shorter-term auctions. The intermediary becomes the contractual buyer and subsequent seller, carrying the difference between what suppliers require and what later buyers will pay. Public or philanthropic support can cover that difference. For CDR, this could connect developers needing years of predictable revenue with buyers unwilling to make equally long commitments. The lever is the paired purchasing and resale mechanism.

The sponsor should define the purchased unit, eligible methods, storage duration, delivery dates and permitted buyer claims before auctioning it. Separate groups of comparable removals may be needed so short-lived storage does not win against durable removal solely on price. Supply contracts should allocate construction delays, under-delivery, reversals and replacement duties. Resale rules must determine when ownership passes, who retires each unit and what happens to unsold holdings. The intermediary needs dependable purchase funding, cash to cover payment timing and explicit limits on losses. A payment linked to a reference price alone is a contract for difference, rather than this purchase-and-resale mechanism.

Long purchase contracts could make a credible public or charitable commitment available to suppliers before a broad private buyer base exists. Later auctions would let buyers enter for shorter periods and reveal what they will pay for different kinds of removal. Repeated competition could improve contract comparability and give the sponsor evidence for adjusting future purchases. If resale prices increase, receipts can reduce the additional support needed for subsequent transactions, although that outcome depends on demand and must not be assumed when making long-term commitments.

The intermediary can become committed to expensive supply while resale demand remains weak, concentrating losses and unsold units in one organisation. Aggressive supplier bids may depend on facilities that cannot deliver, while overly restrictive eligibility can leave too few credible bidders. Buyers may delay ordinary purchases in anticipation of subsidised auctions. A uniform product can conceal differences in durability or delivery risk, and unclear ownership or retirement rules can produce overlapping claims. Expiring public support is particularly dangerous when purchase contracts continue for years afterwards.

The sponsor and intermediary should publish contracted, delivered, resold and retired volumes separately, alongside purchase payments, resale receipts, administration and remaining contractual exposure. Evaluation should examine the number of independent bidders, supplier concentration, failed deliveries, unsold holdings and subsequent buyer participation outside the scheme. Evidence that contracts change supplier investment decisions should be assessed separately from auction announcements. Persistent resale gaps or limited competition should inform contract quantities, auction timing, product categories and the pace of additional commitments.

The sponsor and intermediary should agree who sets eligibility, approves commitments and absorbs losses. Developers and lenders can test whether payment security and remedies support investment. Prospective buyers should help specify usable contract lengths, unit attributes and claims documentation. Registries and verifiers establish the delivery-to-retirement record, while competition authorities examine equal treatment and market concentration. Independent environmental and community representatives should help identify protections that purchasing contracts must enforce, rather than leaving those issues to price competition.

Public authorities can commission the programme where they can authorise purchases, resales and multi-year funding. This includes supranational, national, regional or state bodies and municipal buyers or utilities acting within their powers. A company or charitable vehicle can establish and operate the intermediary under its own contractual authority. Hintco and its H2Global Foundation owner demonstrate that private and charitable bodies can lead delivery. Joint German-Dutch commissioning illustrates national cooperation; smaller public programmes would require proportionate portfolios and explicit authority to carry resale losses.