ESTABLISHING AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CDR ORGANISATION

Governments can negotiate and bring into force an agreement establishing an intergovernmental organisation with a dedicated CDR mandate, its own governing bodies, staff and operating budget. The organisation could maintain shared evidence, coordinate technical work and help participating countries develop the skills and institutions needed to govern removals. The lever is the creation and resourcing of that durable international capability. It differs from a voluntary CDR coalition or climate club, which can coordinate governments without establishing a separate treaty-based organisation. A dedicated organisation is presented here as a possible CDR application of an established treaty model, not as an existing global CDR agency. Its creation would not itself require countries or companies to purchase removals, finance projects or accept a common credit.

Founding governments should first identify a persistent gap that an existing international body cannot adequately address through a strengthened mandate or funded programme. They must then agree membership, voting rights, financial contributions, headquarters arrangements, legal capacity and the relationship with existing climate, scientific and environmental institutions. A focused initial remit might cover comparable information, technical cooperation and assistance requested by member governments. Powers to certify units, manage finance or supervise compliance would require separate explicit agreement and additional resources. The treaty should protect scientific independence while leaving public decisions accountable to members. Developing-country participation requires more than a formal seat, including affordable contributions, language access and support to participate in technical work.

A permanent institution can retain technical staff and maintain shared work through changes of government and short funding cycles. Member countries can use a common source of evidence and request assistance that would be difficult for smaller administrations to assemble alone. Repeated technical cooperation could make national rules more compatible and expose gaps before they obstruct cross-border activity. Balanced governance could give countries that host removal projects more influence over the international agenda. The strongest opportunity is a durable division of labour, with the organisation supplying shared capacity and existing institutions retaining their established responsibilities. Its usefulness depends on countries applying that work, rather than on the number of members, meetings or reports.

Negotiations can consume years without producing a viable budget or an agreed role. A broadly worded mandate can duplicate existing organisations, while a narrowly promotional mandate can give CDR political endorsement without enough attention to mitigation priorities or environmental risks. Dominant funders may steer technical work toward their preferred methods and export interests. Voluntary funding can leave agreed functions unsupported, while mandatory contributions can accumulate arrears. International legal protections must not prevent effective complaints, financial scrutiny or accountability for the organisation's own activities. Even a well-run institution can issue advice that members do not adopt.

Founding and subsequent reviews should test whether members use the institution's work to change practice. Reporting can connect contributions and staff expenditure with completed assistance, national adoption of technical guidance, recurring data submissions and identified coordination problems resolved. Country partners should assess whether assistance meets their own priorities and builds lasting capability. Evaluation should examine geographical and methodological balance, donor concentration, scientific independence and overlap with existing bodies. The treaty should provide for independent evaluation and periodic mandate review, allowing members to narrow, transfer or discontinue functions that remain unused or duplicate established international services.

Foreign ministries and legal advisers should lead the treaty process, while climate, finance and research authorities define the functions they would use and the contributions they can sustain. Prospective host governments must address headquarters and staff arrangements. Existing international institutions should agree practical divisions of labour and data exchange. Scientists can assess technical independence and the credibility of proposed work programmes. Countries likely to host removals, including those with limited negotiating capacity, should help shape priorities from the outset. Industry, civil society, Indigenous peoples and community representatives should have transparent routes to contribute evidence and challenge proposals, with their advisory roles distinct from member governments' formal decisions.

National governments negotiate the founding agreement, formally approve it through ratification and finance the organisation; the organisation's international governing bodies then direct its staff and budget. A supranational union can join where members have transferred the relevant competence and the treaty permits it. The EU's acceptance of the International Renewable Energy Agency's statute provides that competence-based precedent. The allocation of treaty powers and contributions must avoid double representation between a union and its member states.