Capital Formation and Risk SharingDEBT-FOR-REMOVAL SWAPS
Lever last updated: 10 September 2026
Sovereign debt relief that redirects the resulting savings into a protected national removal programme.
Cost
Low to High
The debtor government pays advisory and transaction costs and commits part of future savings to CDR. Guarantors incur fees, reserves or claims. Total cost varies with the debt converted and programme size.
Complexity
High
Implementation requires sovereign-debt authority, creditor negotiations, guarantees or insurance, fiscal accounting, a protected spending vehicle, CDR eligibility and verification, safeguards, public reporting, contract enforcement and coordination across finance and environment bodies.
Timeline
Short to Medium
A conversion linked to an established programme may begin CDR spending within two years. Negotiating debt terms, guarantees, legislation and delivery systems may extend the first award to three to five years.
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
Innovation & Cost Reduction
Social & Environmental Safeguards
Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
Inputs & Capacity
Demand Formation
Bankability and Cost of Capital
Policy Architecture & Coordination
Overview
A debt-for-carbon-removal swap reduces or refinances a government’s sovereign debt and commits part of the resulting savings to a protected national CDR programme. The government does not normally give removal units to its creditors or remove CO₂ itself. Instead, the programme funds public, private or community projects through grants, infrastructure investment, measurement support or removal purchases. A creditor may cancel debt, or insured replacement finance may let the government repurchase expensive bonds. Existing swaps fund nature conservation rather than verified CDR. They demonstrate this financing structure, not removal outcomes, and cannot replace broader restructuring when debt remains unsustainable.
Key Considerations
The central test is whether the conversion leaves genuine public savings after fees, insurance, new repayments and the CDR commitment. Agreements should state the debt exchanged, currency risk, payment schedule, remedies and control of the protected budget. Creditors normally receive repayment on revised terms, not ownership of removals. Separate programme rules should identify the projects receiving money and determine who owns any resulting units. International transfers require host-country authorisation and a corresponding adjustment where Article 6 applies. The programme also needs lifecycle assessment for projects, storage requirements, safeguards, reversal responsibility, public reporting, independent oversight and community participation.
Opportunities
Where grants or broad debt relief are unavailable, a swap can turn lower debt payments into predictable, multi-year CDR funding without increasing the government’s financing burden. The government can finance rather than operate projects, allowing public, private or community suppliers to develop measurement capacity, prepare facilities, build shared infrastructure or deliver removals. Guarantees can make replacement debt acceptable to investors despite sovereign risk. Nature-swap experience shows the structure is possible, but not that it will produce credible removals or suit countries needing deeper debt relief.
Risks
Fees, insurance and committed spending may absorb most savings, leaving little fiscal benefit. Complex agreements can hide liabilities or restrict future debt management. Weak programme rules may relabel forest protection or avoided emissions as removal. Exchange-rate changes, project failure, diverted funds or missed milestones can strain public budgets. Long commitments may displace other priorities, while poorly governed projects can harm land, water, livelihoods or communities.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public reporting should separate the debt reduction, transaction costs, government savings, transfers into the protected programme and spending by purpose. Verified removals, delivery failures, reversals and ownership or transfer of units show what the programme achieved. Material shortfalls, diverted funds, duplicate claims or safeguards failures should suspend payments, change eligible uses or activate contractual remedies.
Stakeholder Engagement
The transaction requires separate agreement on affordable debt terms and use of the resulting savings. Government debt officials, creditors, arrangers and guarantors negotiate the financial conversion. Climate authorities, programme administrators, CDR suppliers, independent experts, legislators, communities and civil society determine how the protected money is spent, which projects qualify, who owns removal units and how delivery and safeguards are checked.
Governance Levels
National governments alone can alter sovereign debt and utilise the savings, but they need not develop removal projects. International development banks and bilateral finance agencies can provide guarantees, insurance or creditor participation. Banks, bondholders and specialist arrangers negotiate and execute the debt exchange. Philanthropic organisations may fund preparation, protect part of the risk or help administer the spending vehicle. The national government remains responsible for debt sustainability, public accounts and programme rules, while separate public, private or community suppliers can receive finance and deliver the CDR activities.
Implementation Strategies
The government should first test debt sustainability, net savings after all transaction costs and the affordability of the proposed CDR commitment.
Negotiations should specify the debt cancellation, restructuring or refinancing, risk protection, public-account treatment and remedies if either side fails.
Separate programme rules should identify eligible CDR spending, project recipients, verification, safeguards and ownership or international transfer of any removal units.
Independent fiscal, technical and community oversight should determine whether payments continue, eligible uses change or contractual remedies are triggered.
Case Studies

Belize’s debt-for-marine-conservation conversion
In November 2021, Belize completed a debt conversion arranged by The Nature Conservancy. New finance insured by the United States development bank allowed the government to repurchase USD 553 million of bonds at 55 cents per dollar, reducing external debt by about ten per cent of national income. Belize then committed roughly USD 4 million annually to marine conservation until 2041. Creditors received repayment through the financial transaction, not ownership of reefs, mangroves or carbon units. The case shows how cheaper sovereign finance can create protected long-term spending.

Ecuador’s Galápagos debt conversion
Ecuador completed its Galápagos debt conversion in May 2023. A USD 85 million Inter-American Development Bank guarantee and USD 656 million of United States political-risk insurance supported cheaper finance used to purchase existing public debt. The transaction projected more than USD 1.126 billion in lifetime savings and committed USD 323 million to an independent conservation fund over 18.5 years. Creditors and guarantors did not receive marine assets or carbon units. The arrangement exchanged improved debt terms for protected conservation spending, demonstrating a possible CDR financing structure.

El Salvador’s Río Lempa debt conversion
El Salvador closed a USD 1 billion debt conversion in October 2024. J.P. Morgan provided replacement finance, while the United States development bank supplied political-risk insurance and CAF provided additional credit protection. The transaction was expected to save USD 352 million and direct USD 350 million over twenty years to watershed conservation grants. The lenders and guarantors received financial repayment and protection, not ownership of the river or environmental credits. The case demonstrates how several institutions can refinance sovereign debt and protect future programme spending, but the example concerns ecosystem conservation rather than verified CDR.
More Capital Formation and Risk Sharing

Advance market commitments
A binding promise to buy a set volume of removals at an agreed price once suppliers deliver.
Cost
Low to Very high
Complexity
Medium to High
Timeline
Very short to Medium
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
2–4Innovation & Cost Reduction
2–5Social & Environmental Safeguards
1–3Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
N/AInputs & Capacity
N/ADemand Formation
3–5Bankability and Cost of Capital
3–5Policy Architecture & Coordination
1–3
Carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs)
A guaranteed price per verified tonne that tops up revenue when the market price falls short.
Cost
Low to Very high
Complexity
High
Timeline
Short to Medium
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
2–3Innovation & Cost Reduction
2–4Social & Environmental Safeguards
1–3Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
N/AInputs & Capacity
N/ADemand Formation
2–4Bankability and Cost of Capital
4–5Policy Architecture & Coordination
2–4Publicly Supported Currency Hedging
Public backing enabling a specialist provider to offer currency hedges CDR developers can't get commercially.
Cost
Low to Medium
Complexity
Low to High
Timeline
Very short to Medium
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
N/AInnovation & Cost Reduction
N/ASocial & Environmental Safeguards
N/AEnergy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
N/AInputs & Capacity
N/ADemand Formation
1–2Bankability and Cost of Capital
3–4Policy Architecture & Coordination
1–2©2026 Alexander Mäkelä and Carbon Gap.
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Headline and barrier scores based on Carbon Gap analysis.