ARPA-STYLE HIGH-RISK RESEARCH PROGRAMMES

An ARPA-style research programme gives fixed-term programme directors unusual freedom to pursue difficult technical goals through portfolios of high-risk research projects. Directors define a problem, select different approaches, set demanding milestones and can redirect or stop work as evidence changes. For CDR, a dedicated portfolio could address cross-cutting barriers such as low-energy capture, durable storage measurement or new removal pathways that ordinary research calls consider too uncertain. The lever differs from conventional grants because programme directors actively manage a portfolio after awards rather than selecting projects against a fixed call and waiting for final reports.

The model depends on real autonomy within clear public accountability. Founding rules determine who appoints programme directors, how long they serve, which funding tools they control and how readily they can change milestones or end projects. Programme goals need to describe a technical barrier and measurable advances without predetermining one method. Portfolio evaluation needs to tolerate individual failures while detecting weak management or repeated neglect of evidence. Intellectual property, publication of useful negative results, conflicts, safety and handover to later research, demonstration or procurement programmes also need explicit treatment.

Active portfolio management can pursue several competing solutions and shift resources as evidence emerges. Fixed-term directors bring specialist researchers into public service and make decisions faster than a conventional annual grant cycle. A CDR portfolio can create prototypes, measurement tools and technical options for later demonstration or demand policies. Publishing failed approaches can prevent duplication. Value should be judged through learning and options at portfolio level, not by expecting every project to succeed or the agency itself to deliver commercial removal.

Political leaders may withdraw support after a visible failure even though high-risk portfolios are expected to lose projects. Autonomy without scrutiny can produce favouritism, conflicts or fashionable programmes disconnected from important CDR barriers. Aggressive milestones may undervalue slower science, while poor handover can strand successful prototypes. Follow-on investment may reflect selection of strong teams rather than agency impact. Without authority to redirect awards, recruit specialists or stop weak work, the institution becomes a grant agency.

Assessment should operate at programme and portfolio level, covering milestone decisions, projects redirected or ended, technical results, useful negative findings, handovers and follow-on finance. Reviewers should distinguish credible high-risk failure from weak selection or management. Persistent delays in appointments, risk-averse portfolios or weak handovers should inform leadership and future programme design without inviting political approval of individual technical decisions.

Legislators and finance ministries need early agreement on autonomy, accountability and tolerance for portfolio failure. Programme directors draw problem definitions from researchers, engineers, CDR suppliers, measurement experts and downstream users without turning consultation into a vote on awards. Independent advisers scrutinise safety, ethics and conflicts, while demonstration agencies, regulators, procurement bodies and investors clarify what evidence successful projects need next.

National governments and supranational institutions can create dedicated research programmes or agencies within their research and budget powers. The defining requirements are specialist programme directors, multi-year resources, active portfolio management and authority to redirect or end work. The European Innovation Council already uses fixed-term programme managers and actively managed portfolios, although its discretion is governed by EU funding rules. Private high-risk laboratories remain a separate institutional model.