Voluntary and Normative DriversINTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION ON CDR
Lever last updated: 14 September 2026
A continuing joint programme of work between governments on a shared CDR problem.
Cost
Very low to Low
Participating governments pay for coordination staff, meetings, studies and technical exchanges. Using an existing forum costs less than maintaining a dedicated secretariat and work programme. National research grants, subsidies and infrastructure investments have separate budgets.
Complexity
Low to Medium
Voluntary cooperation uses existing diplomatic powers. A substantive work programme needs agreed responsibilities, shared definitions, project reporting and staff able to develop technical or policy products for use by several governments.
Timeline
Very short to Short
Existing partners may apply a jointly developed tool or coordinate a research call within a year. A new programme may need one to two years to agree tasks, produce useful work and secure its first adoption.
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
Innovation & Cost Reduction
Social & Environmental Safeguards
Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
Inputs & Capacity
Demand Formation
Bankability and Cost of Capital
Policy Architecture & Coordination
Overview
Governments can establish a continuing programme of work to solve a shared policy or technology problem together. They agree an objective, divide tasks and contribute staff, expertise or funding, with ministers or senior officials reviewing progress. Joint studies, coordinated research programmes and shared policy guidance can then be used by national agencies. Applied to CDR, governments could compare measurement rules, coordinate demonstrations or develop common approaches to buying removals and regulating storage. Pooling this work can help countries gain expertise and learn from each other's projects. Participation and the agreed contributions determine what the cooperation achieves; a joint announcement by itself creates neither domestic regulation nor a funded removal programme.
Key Considerations
Members need to agree who may join, whether membership requires specific actions and how work is divided. A shared target is more useful when each government identifies the studies, policy decisions or programme support it will contribute. The coalition should define which activities count towards its goal and distinguish announced projects from financed or operating facilities. An existing ministerial forum can provide staff and continuity, while a new arrangement needs an agreed host, budget and decision process. Members should also decide how scientists, industry and civil society can contribute without replacing governments' responsibility for the commitments.
Opportunities
Joint technical work can spread the cost of comparing removal methods, evaluating safeguards and designing usable policies across several governments. Members can adapt common purchasing or storage rules and learn from one another's demonstrations instead of repeating every study. Smaller countries gain access to expertise and an opportunity to influence emerging practice. Ministerial progress reviews can also expose commitments that have stalled and prompt the responsible ministry to act. These benefits are strongest when the coalition assigns staff and produces outputs that domestic agencies can use, rather than relying on a shared declaration to change policy by itself.
Risks
Shared targets can obscure a lack of national action when members have no assigned responsibilities or budget. Project totals can overstate progress if they count early announcements alongside operating facilities. A coalition dominated by fossil-carbon interests may direct most work towards emissions capture while describing the results as progress on removal. Changes of government can also interrupt participation. Overlapping coalitions place additional demands on the same officials, so new meetings and reporting requirements should be justified by work that existing institutions cannot already perform.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Member governments should report their staff and funding contributions, joint outputs and resulting domestic decisions. Project reporting should distinguish announcements, engineering work, investment decisions and operation, with atmospheric removals shown separately. Evaluation should examine whether agencies used the coalition's studies or templates and whether joint research led to funded work. Ministers can use those findings to reassign responsibilities, combine overlapping activities or discontinue work that members are not using.
Stakeholder Engagement
Member ministries should assign officials and budgets to agreed tasks, while implementing agencies explain which technical or legal questions block domestic action. Scientists can assess methods and distinguish removal from other forms of carbon management. Industry should provide checkable project information, including development status and dependencies. Civil society and affected groups need structured opportunities to scrutinise safeguards and published progress, while governments retain responsibility for the coalition's commitments.
Governance Levels
National governments form and implement the coalition, supranational institutions may participate within their mandates, and international platforms organise the shared work. Domestic instruments remain necessary to turn cooperation into spending, rules or projects. Companies and civil society can contribute expertise but do not make the intergovernmental commitment themselves.
Implementation Strategies
Members should agree a measurable objective and a method for counting progress, with atmospheric removals separated from other carbon-management activities. Each government should identify the contribution and domestic actions for which it is responsible.
Governments should use an existing ministerial or innovation forum where it can do the work, and fund the staff and technical tasks required. Any new body should have a clear purpose, host and arrangements that survive changes of ministers.
The work programme should produce usable tools, such as model storage rules, procurement designs, measurement comparisons or joint research priorities. Member agencies should test them domestically and report what they changed as a result.
Members should publish progress by project stage and contribution, then review which activities reached funded implementation. Scientists and civil-society observers can challenge classifications, safeguards and unsupported claims before the next ministerial review.
Case Studies
Carbon Management Challenge
The Carbon Management Challenge is a voluntary government initiative launched in 2023 covering carbon capture, removal, use and storage. Members aim to advance a project pipeline by 2030 that would manage at least one billion tonnes of CO₂ annually when fully operational. They choose their national contributions, which can include policy changes, finance or research support. Committees and three workstreams organise cooperation on developing-country project finance, project tracking and communications. This gives governments a recurring process for comparing progress and identifying shared obstacles while leaving domestic decisions with members. The target concerns a development pipeline, not one billion tonnes already operating in 2030, and it includes fossil capture as well as CDR. Separate reporting is therefore necessary to understand how much of the effort supports atmospheric removal.
Mission Innovation's CDR Mission
Mission Innovation is an international government initiative supporting clean-energy research. Its CDR Mission's September 2022 action plan connects shared innovation priorities with collaborative projects and demonstrations. At COP27 in November 2022, it launched the CDR Launchpad. Participating governments committed to a demonstration of at least 1,000 tonnes annually in each member and collectively at least USD 100 million for pilots and demonstrations by 2025. They also committed staff time or other technical resources, rather than only cash, to measurement and verification work. The arrangement makes cooperation concrete through national demonstration commitments and shared technical learning, rather than requiring each country to develop every approach alone. The launch announcement records what members promised; it does not establish that those 2025 commitments were all fulfilled.
Group of Negative Emitters (GONE)
Denmark, Finland and Panama initiated the Group of Negative Emitters (GONE) at COP28 in 2023 to encourage countries to pursue net-negative emissions and develop the policies needed to achieve them. At its formal launch at COP29 in 2024, five additional countries joined, including Ethiopia, Kenya and Suriname. Members use ministerial meetings, policy discussions and knowledge sharing to promote stronger national climate plans and long-term strategies. The alliance brings governments together with researchers, businesses and other partners to discuss how biological and technological removals can contribute. For example, its COP30 ministerial event examined how updated national climate commitments could incorporate CDR and negative emissions. This gives participating ministries a recurring forum for building political support and learning from other countries’ approaches. Governments remain responsible for translating that cooperation into domestic targets, funding and implementation; the alliance’s expansion does not itself demonstrate additional removals.
More Voluntary and Normative Drivers

Awareness Campaigns and Public Engagement
Public education activities giving people information about carbon removal and its trade-offs.
Cost
Very low to Medium
Complexity
Very low to Medium
Timeline
Very short to Medium
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
1–2Innovation & Cost Reduction
N/ASocial & Environmental Safeguards
2–3Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
N/AInputs & Capacity
N/ADemand Formation
1–2Bankability and Cost of Capital
N/APolicy Architecture & Coordination
1–2
Voluntary Industry Codes and Participation Requirements
An industry-run code of conduct that participating firms agree to follow.
Cost
Very low to Low
Complexity
Low to Medium
Timeline
Very short to Medium
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
1–3Innovation & Cost Reduction
N/ASocial & Environmental Safeguards
1–3Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
N/AInputs & Capacity
N/ADemand Formation
1–2Bankability and Cost of Capital
N/APolicy Architecture & Coordination
1–3
Internal Carbon Fees and Shadow Pricing
An internal price on emissions that shapes an organisation's own investment decisions.
Cost
Very low to High
Complexity
Very low to Medium
Timeline
Very short to Short
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
1–2Innovation & Cost Reduction
1–2Social & Environmental Safeguards
1–2Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
N/AInputs & Capacity
N/ADemand Formation
1–4Bankability and Cost of Capital
1–3Policy Architecture & Coordination
1–2©2026 Alexander Mäkelä and Carbon Gap.
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Headline and barrier scores based on Carbon Gap analysis.