Market Creation and Price SignalsEMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM
Lever last updated: 8 September 2026
A mechanism capping emissions and allowing trading of allowances.
Cost
Low
Public cost is administrative; compliance costs fall on covered industry. Evidence: the EU ETS runs on existing registry and auction machinery, and removal integration adds certification interfaces rather than fiscal spending.
Complexity
High
Evidence: the UK integration required a multi-year design process, primary legislation targeted for 2028, and new ex-post allowance, liability and buffer-pool rules (UK ETS Authority response, July 2025).
Timeline
Medium to Long
Evidence: the UK’s decision-to-integration path (July 2025 to end-2029) spans four years, and the Commission’s July 2026 proposal points at entry after 2030.
Integrity, Transparency & MRV
Innovation & Cost Reduction
Social & Environmental Safeguards
Energy, Transport & Storage Infrastructure
Inputs & Capacity
Demand Formation
Bankability and Cost of Capital
Policy Architecture & Coordination
Overview
An Emissions Trading System (ETS) is typically a cap-and-trade mechanism capping emissions and allowing trading of allowances. Integrating CDR into an ETS means letting negative emissions count toward compliance, via credits or separate removal certificates. For example, the EU ETS envisions achieving a net-negative cap by 2045 with CDR support. It is still determining how best to integrate removals (within the ETS or via a parallel market).
Key Considerations
Including CDR requires careful accounting so removals are real and permanent. Policymakers must prevent cheap removal credits from undermining direct emissions cuts, possibly by separate targets for reductions vs. removals. Only high-integrity CDR methods (with rigorous MRV and permanence) should qualify. Price levels are pivotal – most ETS prices today are too low to drive costly CDR technologies, so complementary incentives or price floors may be needed.
Opportunities
Linking CDR to a carbon market unlocks large-scale finance and demand for removals. An ETS with CDR credits could spur investment in negative emissions as companies seek cost-effective compliance. Over time, this enables net-negative emissions caps and accelerates DAC, BECCS, etc. A dedicated removals market alongside the ETS has been proposed to incentivise permanent removals while preserving a strong carbon price.
Risks
If not tightly controlled, CDR credits in an ETS could dilute mitigation (firms offsetting instead of reducing). Strong limits or separate quotas for removals are needed to avoid this. Other risks include double-counting (a removal used in multiple claims), uncertain permanence, and political resistance if allowance prices rise sharply. Some stakeholders advocate keeping removals out of ETS until rigorous safeguards are in place.
Monitoring and Evaluation
A CDR-inclusive ETS requires rigorous MRV of removal units. Regulators must verify each credit’s authenticity and track usage. Regular reviews should assess whether the inclusion of CDR is achieving additional climate benefits and adjust rules (e.g. credit limits or quality criteria) as needed.
Stakeholder Engagement
Industry needs clarity on future rules, while NGOs demand transparency and integrity in how removals are used. Engaging experts to develop certification standards (e.g. the EU Carbon Removal Certification Framework) builds trust. Ongoing dialogue with all stakeholders can address concerns (e.g. offsetting vs reduction) and refine the approach.
Governance Levels
State-level systems pioneered the instrument and still run it, with California’s cap-and-trade sized in this entry’s own table. National schemes in the UK and New Zealand are carrying removal integration furthest, and the supranational EU ETS is the largest demand engine the Union owns. International coordination under Article 6 keeps linked and adjacent markets consistent as removals enter.
Implementation Strategies
Strategies include piloting a parallel Removal Trading Scheme for specific sectors or using an intermediary “carbon central bank” to manage removal credit supply within the ETS.
Gradual phase-in with quantitative limits or exchange rates for removal units can maintain ambition.
Policymakers should invest in rigorous certification (ensuring permanence and additionality) and may introduce minimum price guarantees for removals to spur supply.
Case Studies
| EU ETS | UK ETS | New Zealand ETS | California cap-and-trade | Shenzhen ETS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1,386 MtCO₂e (2024) | 86.7 MtCO₂e (2025) | 19.1 MtCO₂e (2025) | 267.4 MtCO₂e or MtCO₂ (2025) | — |

EU ETS
Today, the EU ETS does not accept carbon-removal credits. The architecture for change is now assembling, however. The first Carbon Removal Certification Framework methodologies for permanent removals (DACCS, BioCCS and biochar) were adopted in February 2026, giving any future integration a certified unit to reference, and the Commission’s statutory report on negative emissions technologies under the revised ETS Directive is due by 31 July 2026. The integration debate has crystallised around three design families: central public purchasing of removals financed from allowance revenues, operator-led surrender of removal units for compliance, and one-in-one-out substitution in which removal units replace allowances under an unchanged cap. Whichever design prevails, the direction of travel is set by the 2040 framework’s arithmetic: a net target without removal supply is not deliverable, and the ETS is the largest demand engine the Union owns.

UK ETS
The UK ETS Authority’s Main Response (21 July 2025) confirms engineered GGRs will be integrated by end-2029 (legislation targeted by 2028). Integration will keep the gross cap unchanged by replacing emissions allowances one-for-one with removal allowances issued ex-post. The framework includes a minimum 200-year storage requirement, operator liability for reversals, and buffer-pool provisions.

New Zealand ETS
NZ ETS fully integrates removals: forestry generates NZUs that are fungible with emissions units for compliance. The government’s latest settings account for significant removal supply; ICAP notes ~13.8 million NZUs from removals forecast for 2025, mainly forestry. Authorities have flagged excess unit risks and advised reducing auction volumes to protect ambition, underscoring how integrated removals materially shape ETS market dynamics. ICAP Carbon Action+1

California cap-and-trade
Offsets (including forestry) are integrated with limits: up to 4% of a covered entity’s obligation for 2021–2025, rising to 6% for 2026–2030, with at least 50% of any offset use required to deliver direct environmental benefits in California (DEBs). Offsets remain distinct from allowances and are subject to buyer-liability invalidation rules, so they complement but do not replace the core allowance market.

Shenzhen ETS
Shenzhen launched China’s first pilot carbon market in 2013, following approval by the National Development and Reform Commission. The municipal government sets the annual allowance total and allocation rules, maintains the registry, oversees trading and verification, and enforces compliance. By 2024, cumulative trading had exceeded 100 million tonnes. Shenzhen therefore demonstrates that an ETS can be operated at City/Municipal level, but not necessarily established independently: the pilot relied on national authorisation and Shenzhen’s special-economic-zone legislative powers. It covers emissions rather than CDR, so its relevance is as a governance precedent rather than evidence for integrating removals.
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Removal Compliance System
An annual purchase obligation requiring covered companies to buy verified permanent removals.
Cost
Low to Medium
Complexity
Medium to High
Timeline
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Integrity, Transparency & MRV
3–4Innovation & Cost Reduction
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Carbon Tax
A direct tax on carbon emissions to incentivise reductions.
Cost
Very low to Low
Complexity
Low to High
Timeline
Very short to Long
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2–4Social & Environmental Safeguards
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Carbon price floor for removals
A minimum price guarantee for carbon credits to drive investment.
Cost
Low to High
Complexity
Low to High
Timeline
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Integrity, Transparency & MRV
N/AInnovation & Cost Reduction
2–3Social & Environmental Safeguards
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2–3©2026 Alexander Mäkelä and Carbon Gap.
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Headline and barrier scores based on Carbon Gap analysis.