Pol-ing its own climate weight: can Poland fulfil its carbon removal potential?
The recent Carbon Removal Readiness Assessment for Poland shows that the country could potentially become net-negative, but there is a lot standing in the way of it getting there.
When we think of carbon dioxide removal, Poland is not often the first country to come to mind. Yet a new Carbon Removal Readiness Assessment from Carbon Gap and Sweco makes a compelling case for why that ought to change. The report maps Poland's physical potential for carbon removal against the current socio-economic and political landscape, and it’s a weighty find: Poland is sitting on substantial, largely untapped CDR capacity, that has yet to fully wake up to what it has.
Where Poland stands today
Poland is legally bound by the EU's 2050 climate neutrality target but has not yet written that commitment into national law. There is no long-term climate strategy, no national CDR targets, and carbon removal barely features in domestic policy debate. Coal remains central to the energy mix, and questions of energy security and industrial competitiveness continue to dominate the political conversation.
Yet Poland has many cards up its proverbial sleeve it could use if it chose to. It has extensive forests, significant peatlands, and large swathes of agricultural land, useful not only for land-based CDR methods but also for biomass conversion methods like BECCS or biochar. More importantly, it has excellent feedstocks for geochemical CDR and sits on substantial geological CO2 storage capacity that remains almost entirely undeveloped. The cards are all there, the question is whether the country will pol(pun intended) them out and play them.
If ambitious, Poland could go beyond net-zero
The assessment models two realistic pathways to 2050, and the gap between them is instructive.
The first - a low ambition scenario - is essentially a continuation of current trends. Policy effort stays limited, resources are directed primarily elsewhere, and CDR deployment grows slowly. Under this pathway, Poland removes around 7 Mt CO2 per year by 2030, rising to around 16 Mt CO2 by 2050. Add in Poland's natural forest carbon sink, and those figures reach approximately 47 Mt CO2 in 2030 and 56 Mt CO2 in 2050. Progress, but not transformation.
The second - a high ambition scenario - tells a very different story. CDR is actively pursued across multiple sectors. Peatland restoration accelerates, geological storage is developed and expanded, and a greater share of biomass and land resources is directed towards carbon removal. Under this pathway, Poland reaches around 15 Mt CO2 per year by 2030 and 45 Mt CO2 by 2050 - or up to 85 Mt CO2 when the natural forest sink is included. Poland's residual emissions in 2050 are estimated at 30-50 Mt CO2. In other words, under the high ambition scenario, Poland does not merely reach net-zero - it goes beyond it.
Geological CO2 storage is single biggest factor separating these two futures. It’s a question of whether Poland will pool its resources to reach and perhaps surpass net-zero.
Poland's barriers are real, but they are not insurmountable
The most fundamental barrier to scaling CDR in Poland is the absence of a policy framework. Without national CDR targets or a long-term climate strategy that integrates emissions reductions with carbon removals, there is no signal for investors or project developers to act on. Hard-to-abate industrial sectors, which will eventually need access to carbon management solutions, are left without a credible roadmap, looking for a door that has not yet been built.
The policy barrier is further compounded by the issue that CDR projects typically carry high upfront costs and long payback periods. Private investment will not flow without predictable revenue, whether through the EU Emissions Trading System, Carbon Contracts for Difference, or dedicated public procurement. None of these mechanisms currently exists for CDR in Poland.
Geological storage, though abundant, is currently prioritised for industrial emissions reduction rather than CDR, and the infrastructure is in early stages of development and will require planning decisions that need to begin now, not in 2040.
Currently, public awareness remains limited, but engagement and education shift attitudes. Nature-based approaches like afforestation, peatland restoration, and carbon farming already attract genuine public support, and interest in technologies like BECCS and biochar is growing. The public conversation is not absent; it just needs to be pulled in the right direction.
The path ahead
Poland is not a peripheral player in the European CDR story, it is a central one. The country’s geological storage resources alone could eventually support not just domestic decarbonisation but the carbon management needs of neighbouring countries. It could even become a regional hub for CO2 transport and storage infrastructure in a way that few other Member States could match.
But none of that happens without policy. The immediate priority is a long-term climate strategy that takes CDR seriously, one that sets national targets, creates the conditions for investment, and connects climate neutrality objectives with industrial policy and carbon management planning.
With the right pol-icy in place, Poland could become the regional carbon removal heavy-weight.